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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

)

FRANCES T. WIGHTMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)

vs.
BETTILYON'S, INC. and

Case No. 9987

)

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,

a municipal corporation,

)

DefendantsRespondents.

)
)

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff seeks damages for personal injuries
resulting when she tripped at night over high weeds
growing from abutting property onto and obstructing
the Salt Lake City public sidewalk, Bettilyon's,
Inc. being the occupant of the abutting property.

DISPOSITION OF

CPSE

IN

LO~mR

COURT

The Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt

Lal~e

County, Aldon J. Anderson, Judge, granted

each defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaintiff appeals therefrom as to each defendant.

2

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEPL
·Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Summary Judgment in favor of each defendant made and entered
by the Third Judicial District Court in and for

Salt Lake County on August 7, 1963 and remand of
the action for trial upon the merits as to each
defendant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On appeal from Summary Judgment, the dis-

favored party is entitled not only to have the
court consider all facts in the record and
inferences fairly arising therefrom in light most
favorable to him, but is also entitled to rely
on his pleadings unless the record precludes all
reasonable possibility of recovery and indisputably
resolves against him all allegations of fact.
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., (1960),
11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559; Tanner v. Utah Poultry

&Farmers Cooperative (1961), 11 Utah 2d 101, 377
P. 2d 1010. Therefore, in setting out the facts,
plaintiff, as disfavored party, will not only refer
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to the record herein but will also set out those
facts outside the record on which plaintiff would

rely to support the allegations of the Complaint
and which are not contradicted by the record.

Plaintiff, a 58-year old widow, sustained a
fractured right hip in falling on August 22, 1962,
about 9:00p.m., on the public sidewalk on the

south side of Zenith Avenue a few steps east of the
sidewall' intersection on Highland Drive in Salt
Lake City.

Highland Drive is a major thoroughfare

running almost north and south, and Zenith Avenue
is a residential street running east and west.

At the time of the accident, and during the

three months preceding, Bettilyon's was in
possession and control of the real property located

on the southeast corner of Zenith Avenue and Highland
Drive, which abutted the sidewalk where plaintiff

fell (R. 22).

Plaintiff would show that before June

of 1961, Bettilyon's used the property to sell swimming pools and had built a display pool with
attractive and appropriate

1~~

and landscaping

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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thereon.

A high chain link fence was erected

along the north side of the property running within
about two feet of the south side of the south side-

walk on Zenith Avenue.

After June of 1961,

Bettilyon 1 s ceased doing active business on the
property (R. 22), the property was not maintained
and it fell into a state of total neglect.

By

August, 1962, high weeds grew up on the property
and on both sides of the fence along the Zenith

Avenue sidewalk.

The weeds surrounding the

side~~alk

were three to four feet high and grew over and onto

the public sidewalk, leaving only an apparently
clear narrow path of about two feet through which

pedestrians could walk (Defendants' Exhibit 2).
Plaintiff would show that defendants• Exhibit
2 is a photograph taken within a week after plain-

tiff's accident showing the condition of the sidewalk when plaintiff fell.

During her deposition,

plaintiff marked Exhibit 2 l-1ith an ink "x' 1 to show

the approximate point where she fell. (Deposition
P· 22).

Plaintiff would show that the photograph

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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is a

vie\o~

looking east up the Zenith Avenue side-

walk with the photographer standing at the sidewalk

intersection with the Highland Drive side\·1allt.

Defendants' Exhibits 1, 3, 4 and 5 are photographs
shouing various views looking north or south on

the same sidewalk at various stages after the fence
and improvements were removed from the property and
lo~eeds

cleared al1ay by Bettilyon' s after plaintiff 1 s

accident.

Plaintiff is also including with the

Exhibits admitted in evidence a sixth photograph,
which plaintiff "1ould sho\1 is a view looking west
dotm

the Zenith Avenue side\-1alk fron1 the east side

of Bettilyon•s property showing more graphically

the height of the weeds and extent of obstruction
at the time plaintiff fell.
On the north-east corner of the intersection
of Highland Drive and Zenith Avenue ·Has sitauted

the Beefeaters Inn.

Plaintiff 'vould show that the

Inn had numerous cars moving in and out of its

parking lot opening onto both Highland Drive and
Zenith Avenue.
Thus it '~ould be less safe for a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pedestrian to walk on the north side of Zenith
Avenue, past the often used Beefeaters • drivel-lay,
than to wallt on a regular residential side't-lalk.

The next intersection east of Highland Drive on

Zenith Avenue is 14th East, a distance of approximately 880 feet from Highland Drive.

Plaintiff lived for one month before the accident in the east side of a duplex situated

immediately east of Bettilyon 1 s property on Zenith
Avenue.

Mr. Alec Birrell owned the duplex and

lived in its west side.

Plaintiff had complained

of the weeds to the Salt Lake City Street Department
before the accident (Deposition p. 16) and Mr.
Birrell had complained of the ,.,eeds at least three
times to the city before the accident (Deposition
p. 18).

On August 22, 1962, plaintiff walked west

from her home along the sidewalk past the weeds and
south on the east sidewalk of Highland Drive to a
grocery store.

There she bought a small sack of

groceries, met Mr. Birrell, and walked back with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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him along the same route.

On approaching Zenith

Avenue she said to Mr. Birrell, "Here is where we
~tingle

file''

(Deposition p. 17).

She did not

notice anything about the sidewalk to alarm her
~eposition
\~ould

p. 17).

Plaintiff and Mr. Birell

testify that plaintiff moved forward,

watching where she was going to make her way
along the path through the weeds.

Without warn-

ing. she felt her right foot caught in something
as if it were a "loop or noose" around her right

ankle (Deposition pp. 18,20).

She was pulled to

the ground and when others attempted to lift her,

she then and only then found her foot tangled in

the loop or noose of weeds.

The persons lifting

her had to pull her foot back out of the weeds

rather than lifting her straight up (Deposition
p. 8).

Plaintiff would show that the noose was

formed by sticky yellow tops on the weeds
adhering together.
Plaintiff testified at page 18 of her
Deposition:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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"Q.

A.

You didn't even observe what caused
you to fall?

No, DOt until after I had fallen and

was caught."

At

page 20,

''Q.

she said:

And how was it caught?

A.

Let's see, how I can word it. Just
as if my foot had caught in something
like that. I can't describe it other
than my foot was caught in the weeds
as if it were a loop or noose.

Q.

Did you examine the sidewalk carefully

enough to determine whether or not
there was a pathway past those weeds?
A.

Those weeds underneat· ·.1~-r~ not visible.

The weeds on the side came over, and I
was walking according to them. I don't
think most people walk with their face
right down, right there.

Q.

But when you went to the store did you
take the same route?

A.

Oh, yes.

Q.

And you didn't have any trouble in
getting by them then. You didn't
catch your feet in the weeds?

A.

Not in going down."

Mr. Birrell was walking immediately behind
her when she fell and would testifY that he and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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plaintiff were not talking when she fell and as

far as he could tell from his position in the
rear, she was watching where she was walking to
get past the weeds and was proceeding cautiously.

As to lighting of the area, plaintiff said
at page 9 of her Deposition:
·~.

There is an arc light, is there not,
on the corner?

A•

A very poor one •

Q.

l-1ell, isn 1 t there an arc light which
lights up the corner for the parking
at the Beefeaters Cafe?

A.

Well, they have a big floodlight around
the side of their place for their own
driveway.

Q.

So that the street is fairly well
illuminated?

A.

Well, it is a little past a country
street. It isn't a bright lighted
street but is the corner where you
can see to turn.

Q. Now at 9:00 it wasn't pitch dark, as
we have described?
A.

No, but it was enough for the city to
have turned on their lights.

Q. Was it dusk?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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A.

No. It was later than that. It was
dark. It wasn't pitch dark but it
had turned dark. It was past the
twilight and that sort of period. 11

At the time of the accident, plaintiff was a
beautician (Deposition p. 6) and thus was active

and used to being on her feet.

She was wearing a

pair of low shoes with heels about one-inch high,
"a good walking shoe" (Deposition p. 16).

At times before the accident, plaintiff had

walked around the area rather than past the weeds,
but she testified she did so not because of fear

of falling but because the weeds had sticky tops
on them which spotted dresses (Deposition pp. 5,

16), and on the occasion of the accident she was
wearing sports clothes and was not concerned about

spots, so she took the path past the weeds
(Deposition p. 17).
Bettilyon's, Inc. moved for Summary Judgment
on the grounds that the record showed (1)

Betti1yon's had no duty to eliminate natural weeds
growing over the city sidewalk, (2) plaintiff
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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assumed the risk of walking on the sidewalk as a

matter of law, and (3) plaintiff was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law (R. 24).

Defendant

Salt Lalce City Corporation joined in the Motion upon
the latter two grounds (R. 26).

At hearing on the

Motion, defendants' Exhibits 1 through 5, the five
photographs were admitted in evidence for purposes
of the Motion, and plaintiff's Deposition was

published.

Based on such Exhibits and Deposition,

the Complaint, Answers, Pre-Trial Order and
Bettilyon' s

Ans,~ers

to Interrogatories, the Court

entered Summary Judgment in favor of each defendant
(R. 28, 29).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT

BETTILYON'S, INC. HAD NO DUTY TO ELtMINATE WEEDS
GROWING OVER THE PUBLIC SIDEWALl<, THAT THE WEEDS

WERE NOT AN OBSTRUCTION CONSTITUTING A NUISANCE
WHICH BE'rl'ILYON'S SHOULD HAVE REMOVED, AND THAT
THE WEEDS
WERE NATURAL GROWTH AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Billings (Okla.,
1~59),

353 P. 2d 636, recognizes the logical rule

that while an abutter owes no duty to the public
to maintain or repair the public sidewalk, this

being the city's duty, he does owe a duty to
persons lawfully using the sidewalk not to create
or maintain a condition on his property which
forms an obstruction on the public way.

There,

a pedestrian tripped at night over a tree which

had been felled and left for seven or eight
months lying partially on the public sidewalk.
The tree had not been felled by Safeway, but by

one whom Safeway authorized to move a home from
Safeway's property, and to move the home the
tree had to be felled.

The court held that the

mere maintenance by Safeway on its property
abutting the public sidewalk of a dangerous condition to the free flow of traffic over the sidewalk, without regard to the matter of its creation,
was sufficient evidence of negligence to justify

submission of the question of liability to the jury.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
Concho Construction Co. v. Oklahoma Natural

Gas Co., (C. A. lOth, 1953), 201 F. 2d 673, applied
the same rule where a bulldozer operator grading
the shoulder of a highway struck an unmarked under-

ground gas riser, burning the bulldozer.

The pipe

line was on the highway side of what appeared to be
the highway right of way boundary fence, but actually
the fence had been placed several feet south of the

highway right of way boundary line so that the pipe
line was within the boundaries of the gas company's
right of way for the pipe line.

In reversing Summary

Judgment in favor of defendant, the court said at

pages 674-5:
" • • (T)he owner of land abutting a
highway o'-Jes a duty to keep it from being a
source of danger to the public or to travelers
upon and lawful users of the highway • • •
(T)he gas company owed him the same duty that
an abutting property o~ner owes to the ordinary
and customary user of a public highway, that
is, to use reasonable care not to maintain a
dangerous condition which might be injurious
to such users. A question of fact was present
which should have been determined after a
trial of the case and should not have been
disposed of on a Motion for Summary Judgment."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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This Court in Basinger v. Standard Furniture
(1950), 118 Utah 121, 220 P. 2d 117, said:

"there exists no obligation on the part
of an abutter to keep the sidewalk adjoining
his premises in repair, nor is he liable for
any state of disrepair. His obligation can
only arise where he creates through use or
otheno~ise some unsafe or dangerous condition."
The rule that an abutter owes no duty to repair
sidewalk defects he does not cause does not apply
here.

The reason for that rule is succinctly set

out in Joel v. Electrical Research Products, Inc.
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938), 94 F. 2d 588, 590, as:
"The control over sidewalks exercised
of right by the municipality in which they
are located circumscribes the freedom of
action of the abutter and correspondingly
limits his duty to repair."
Such reason obviously does not apply to a sidewalk
obstruction resulting from a condition on abutting
property because the municipality does not exercise
control over the abutting property.

That property,

in this case, was admittedly in possession and

control of defendant Bettilyon 1 s, Inc. (R. 22).
To the extent a condition maintained on abutting
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
property interferes with free use of the side\-Jalk
by pedestrians or is dangerous or unsafe to

pedestrians upon the sidewalk, the abutter is free
to and is best able to remedy such condition.
Since the '.Jeeds must be removed to protect the side-

walk and since the abutter is free to and is best
able to remove them, therefore, there is no reason
to limit his duty to remove the obstruction.

Helpful in

shole~ing

the duty in this case are

the many cases holding that an abutter has a duty
to use due care to prevent trees on his property

from falling on persons lawfully using the highway,
whether or not the landowner actively causes the
fall and whether or not the fall is due to natural
processes.

See the annotation at 11 A.L.R. 2d 636,

collecting such cases.

Such rule follows, as put

in Prosser on Torts (2d Ed., 1955), page 427:

" • • • for the obvious reason that the
man in possession is in a position of control
and best able to prevent harm to others. It
has been said before that the privilege of a
possessor of land to m&te use of his property
is qualified by a due regard for the interests
of Sponsored
others
who may be affected by it. He is
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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under the obligation to make only a reasonable
use of his property, which causes no unreasonable harm to those in the vicinity."
t~hile

the evidence will not show that Bettilyon 1 s

planted the weeds on which plaintiff fell, nor that
Bettilyon's pushed the weeds over onto the sidewalk,
such lacl( of active negligence should

difference.

mal~e

no

Can it be said that an abutter who lets

poison ivy grow on his land and permits it to grow
onto the city sidewalk is not liable for the skin
irritation incurred by pedestrians?
allo'o~

Can an abutter

strong vines to grow from his property over

the city sidewalk and say he has no duty to remove
them to a pedestrian ~.Jho trips thereon?

We think not.

Heeds are not to be compared with natural snow
and ice, which the abutter has no duty to remove

from the public sidewalk unless he causes or otherwise creates an unusual accumulation, because the
abutter does nothing to put snow on the sidewalk and

has no way of preventing it from falling there.

But

the abutter does put ~-1eeds on the sidel-7alk by permitting Sponsored
them
to grow so high that they fall from his
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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property over onto the sideualk.
prevent them from being on the

He can easily

sidet>~alk

by

removing them from the property immediately
bordering the side"1alk.

Snow falls often and irregularly, so it is
an unreasonable burden to require an abutter to
shovel the sidewalk every time it sn0\-1S, night
or day.

Holiever, t-Ieeds grow slol-.7ly and predictably

through the summer, and one removal, at the
abutter's convenience, Hill prevent them from
becoming an unreasonable obstruction to pedestrians.
Snow falls quickly, making it impossible to
lay

do~m

an arbitrary rule as to the exact time

after each storm when the snow must be removed.
But weeds grow slowly and it can be said, without
unduly burdening abutters, that l-1eeds need only be

removed before they become an unreasonable
obstruction to pedestrians.

Such a rule precludes

quibbling about each untrimmed blade of grass on the
side,~allt, for it eliminates trivia as a matter of

lau and Sponsored
leaves
a jury question as to the reasonableness
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of greater overgrowth.
If it is said here that Bettilyon's had no
duty to remove these ueeds, then it must follow

that any abutter throughout any urban area can,
with immunity, allow vegetation from his property
to completely overgrow and completely block any
city sidewalk, and can, l-7ith immunity, force

pedestrians to pick their way through virtual
jungles of thorny, scratchy, rodent-infested,
skin-irritating, litter-collecting overgrowth.
So there is n reasonable basis for the rule of
no

duty for abutters to remove natural snowfall,

and there is a reasonable basis and need for an
opposite rule as to natural overgrowth of weeds

onto the public sidewalk in urban areas.
The rule of the Restatement of Torts, Section
363, being:
"Neither a possessor of land nor a
lessor, vendor or other transferor thereof,
is subject to liability for bodily harm
caused to others outside the land by a
natural condition of the land other than
trees grol-ling near a highway."
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should not be applied in this action for two
reasons.

First, there is no reasonable or logical

basis for the distinction between trees and other
natural vegetation in urban areas, and we have not

found a single ease disclosing the basis for such
distinction.

Surely the duty of an abutter with

regard to trees should be the same as for poison
ivy or strong vines growing across the sidewalk,
f'or
and thus the same/weeds so overgrowing the side-

ualk that they constitute an unreasonable hazard
and obstruction to the public.

Indeed the duty

should be greater for such ,.,eeds because the risk

of harm from ,.,eeds is more obvious in that one can

see weeds on the sidewalk and know that someone

might trip on them, whereas one is not so likely
to

kn~.,

disease.

when a tree is apt to fall from age or

So Prosser, supra, page 431, says:

"The rule of non-liability for natural
conditions was obviously a practical necessity
in the early cases, when land \·1as largely in
a primitive state, It remains a necessity in

rural communities, whero the burden of
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inspecting and improving the land ~ould be
out of all proportion to the harm usually
threatened. Almost without exception the
cases applying to it have arisen in the
country. But it is scarcely a rule suited
to cities, to say that a lando~mer may
escape all liability for serious damage to
his neighbors arising out of his property,
merely by allowing nature to take its course.
There are indications that a different rule
is developing in urban centers. It has been
held that there is liability for negligently
allowing a tree to decay and fall into a
city street, and for permitting malodorous
seaweed to accumulate on a harbor beach."

We submit that it is no less a hardship on
urban abutters to require removal of naturally
created obstructions than to require removal of
artifically created obstructions.

See Arbuckle v.

Wasatch Land & Improvement Co. (1951), 120 Utah
338, 234 P. 2d 607, imposing liability on the
abutter for injury sustained by a user of the
sidewalk who fell on a surveyor's stm(e left alongside the sidewalk by the abutter.
Secondly, the Restatement rule for natural
conditions should not be applied to this case
because there simply is no basis in the record
upon which
the trial court could make a dete~ination
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as to whether or not these weeds were a natural
condition.

The Restatement of Torts in Comment

b following Section 363, says:
'''Natural condition of the land 1 is
used to indicate that the condition of
land has not been changed by any act of
a human being, • • • with or l'lithout the
consent of the then possessor. It is also
used to include the natural growth of
trees, weeds and other vegetation upon
land not artifically made receptive thereto.
On the other hand a structure erected upon
land is a non-natural or artificial condition, as are trees or plants planted or
preserved and changes in the surface by
excavation or filling, irrespective of
l-1hether they are harmful in themselves
or become so only because of the subsequent
operation of natural forces."
The only fact which the trial court had before
it to determine whether or not these weeds were
"natural growth," which the trial court said in its
Summary Judgment was the reason for dismissing

Bettilyon's (R. 22), was the fact that the weeds

were growing.

Such was insufficient evidence

for the Court to determine the fact question of
whether Bettilyon's artificially created a
hazardous non-natural or artificial condition and
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plaintiff is entitled to try her case unless the
record discloses, as a matter of law, that the
weeds were not artificially created.

If this

Court were to apply the rule of no duty on
abutters to remove natural sidewalk overgrowth
in urban areas, l-1hich we urge should not be the
rule, then plaintiff would rely on her proof,
none of '"hich '"as before the trial court, that
Bettilyon 1 s made the land artificially receptive
to weeds by landscaping the area for a swimming
pool and by planting, fertilizing and irrigating
the lalm, thus mal<ing the land more fertile and
more receptive to weeds.

Plaintiff would show

that the fence, a structure created by Bettilyon's,
artificially caused weeds to grow excessively along
the sidewalk, for the fence tended to accumulate
l.Jeeds around it as the wind dropped seeds while
blm-1ing against it.

Finally, plaintiff would

show that the location of the fence within a few
feet of the sidewalk would make all the high weeds
fall onto the sidel-7alk rather than mlling partially
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to the south and partially on the sidewalk.
Plaintiff should be entitled to have submitted
to the jury the factual issue of whether or not
these weeds were artificially or naturally on
the side,-1allt and should not be denied that right
because the trial court assumed that since the
weeds were growing, they t~ere natural growth.

Next, the duty of Bettilyon•s to remove these

weeds from the public sidewalk arose by virtue of
Section 10-8-23, U. C.

A~

1953, which provides:

They (cities) may regulate and control the use of sidewalks and all structures
thereunder or thereover; and they may require
the Olmer or occupant, or the agent of any
owner or occupant, of property to remove all
weeds and noxious vegetation from such pro:perty, and in front thereof to the curb line
of the street, and to keep the sidewalks in
front of such property free from litter,
sno,-1, ice and obstructions."
11

and by Section 10-8-24, u.

-

c.

-

A., 1953, providing:

"They (cities) may regulate and prevent
the throwing or depositing of ashes, offal,
dirt, garbage or any offensive matter in and
prevent injury or obstruction to any street,
sidewalk, avenue, alley, park or public
ground."
Section 38-1-8 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
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Lake City, 1955, enacted pursuant to such statutes,
provides:
"It shall be unlal<lful for any person
owning, occupying or having control of any
premises, to place or permit upon the sidewalk or the half of the street next to such
premises:
(1) any broken l-1are, glass, filth,
rubbish, refuse matter, ice, water, mud,
garbage, ashes, tin cans or other like
substances.

any wagons, lumber, wood, boxes,
fencing, building material, dead trees,
tree stumps, merchandise or other thing
which shall obstruct such public street
or sidewalk or any part thereof, or the
free use and enjoyment thereof, or the
free passage over and upon the same, or
any part thereof without the permission
of the board of conunissioners."
(2)

Defendant Bettilyon's may not escape liability
herein upon the ground that it had no knowledge of

the noose in the weeds which tripped plaintiff,
since as stated in Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed (1954),
1 Utah 2d 308, 265 P. 2d 1013, 1016:

••Negligence may be the proximate cause
of damage even though the actor was not able
to foresee the injury in the precise form in
'o~hich it occurred, nor anticipate the precise
damage l.Jhich would result from his negligence."
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Finally, Bettilyon's bad the duty to remove
these weeds, independent of negligence, because

the weeds were a nuisance.

u. c.

Section 78-38-1,

A., 1953, provides:
"Anything which is injurious to health,
or indecent, or offensive to the senses, or
an obstruction to the free use of property,
so as to interfere with the comfortable
enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance
and the subject of an action."
There are numerous cases in which sidewalk

obstructions or defects have been held to be
nuisances which the abutter has the duty to
remove.

In Salt Lake City v. Schubach (1945),

108 Utah 266, 159 P. 2d 149, where a pedestrian
'~as

injured by a defective sidewalk vault door,

this Court said at pages 152-3:
''The adjoining landowner has no more
right than any other person to do an act
which renders the use of the sidewalk
hazardous or less secure than it would be
but for sue h an act. v1hen he does so, he
is guilty of a nuisance and liable to any
person who using due care is injured thereby.
The person who created or continues the
nuisance is thus liable irrespective of the
question of negligence on his part."
(Emphasis added.)
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In Updegraff v. City of Norman (Okla., 1955),
287 P. 2d 909, a hedge growing into a public alley
from private land was held to be a nuisance which
the city could not be enjoined from removing as an
-

obstruction.

The annotation at 88 A.L.R. 2d 629

recites as the majority rule that while trees along

a highway do not constitute a nuisance per se, they

become a nuisance where they obstruct or interfere
with the use of the highway or street or endanger
the safety of travelers.

Thus, when these weeds are viewed in light of
whether they, as an obstruction, constituted a
nuisance, neat distinctions as to natural versus
unnatural growth, creation versus maintenance of
a condition or active versus passive negligence

will disappear.

For, as said in Calder v. City

and County of San Francisco (Cal., 1942), 123 P.
2d 897, 898-9, in an action pertaining to a defect
in a drivel-lay over the public sidel-1alk:
1

'The final question is: Are the
obstructions or encroachments involved
unreasonable and against the public rights
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and general welfare? • • • The question
always comes back to the point: Are they
unreasonable, and do they make the street
unsafe for the public use? The major factor
in the test on the question of nuisance of
such cases is therefore the factor of
reasonableness and, for all practical purposes, the same factor of reasonableness is
the major factor in test on the question of
negligence.''
So also Prosser, supra, page 431, in discussing the

abutter's duty with regard to natural conditions on
his land, says:
"The suggestion is therefore pertinent
that the ordinary rules as to nuisance should
apply in the case of natural conditions, and
that it is a question of the locality, the
seriousness of the danger, and the ease with
which it may be prevented. 11

So said this Court in Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co.,
71 Utah 1, 262 P. 269, 273 and in Cannon v.

Neuberger, 1 Utah 2d 396, 268 P. 2d 425, 426:
"The test of whether the use of the
property constitutes a nuisance is the
reasonableness of the use complained of in
the particular locality and in the manner
and under the circumstances of the case."
He

submit that the free use of the public side-

walk is a privilege available to the entire public
'

1

hich should not be obstructed without just cause;
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that there was no reason for Bettilyon's to permit
these weeds to grol-1 up so high on its property that
they fell over onto the sidewalk and so obstructed
it that two persons could not walk abreast and so

that pedestrians \·1ere subject to having their
clothes spotted from the sticky weeds;

tha~

an

abutter should not be heard to say it is his right
to be neglectful of and inattentive toward con-

ditions on his urban property to the injury of
others; that it is not an unreasonable burden upon
abutters in urban areas to require them to keep
obstructing growth from their abutting property

off the public sidewalk; that such obstruction
as here existed is by statutory definition a

nuisance; that the weeds in question were not
natural

gro,;,~th;

and that the trial court erred

in holding defendant Bettilyon's, Inc had no
duty to plaintiff to remove weeds.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PLAINTIFF CONTRIBUTORD..Y NEGLIGENT AS A l-IATTER OF LA\~.
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The only evidence in the record tending to

show plaintiff was contributorily negligent is
that plaintiff knew the weeds generally were

present and that she fell.

Such evidence cannot

constitute contributory negligence as a matter of

lau, but must mal<.e a question for the jury.

This

is particularly so in light of the rule that plaintiff, against whom Summary Judgment was granted, is

entitled to have all of the evidence and every

inference fairly arising therefrom construed in the
light most favorable to her, Holland v. Columbia

Iron Mine Co., (1956), 4 Utah 2d 303, 293 P. 2d
700, and the rule that Summary Judgment is not

appropriate unless the record irrefutably disproves
the allegations of the Complaint and makes it appear
that no genuine issue of fact is presentable,

Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Cunningham,
(1960), 10 Utah 2d, 329, 353 P. 2d 168.

In ruling

that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a

matter of la'" and thus dismissing both Bettilyon' s
and the city, the trial court overlooked the facts
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that (1) the accident occurred at night (Deposition
p. 8), (2) that plaintiff's evidence would fully
support the inference that she t-1as walking carefully
fol"\o~ard

past the l'1eeds, and there is no evidence in

the record to negate such inference, (3) that the
area was dimly lighted (Deposition p. 9), (4) that
plaintiff did not see the exact defect which caused
her fall, being the loop or noose formed by the
weeds (Deposition p. 18), (5) that she saw nothing
in the

lo~alk

to alarm her (Deposition p. 17) and

(6) that plaintiff had ,.,alked through the same

path befOre without injury (Deposition p. 18).
Further there was no evidence in the record as to
what alternative routes, and the relative safety
and convenience thereof, were available to plain-

tiff and that was a specific reason given by the
trial court in its Summary Judgment for dism-ssing
both defendants

Rodriguez

(i. 22).
v, City of Los Angeles, (Cal.,

1959) 341 P. 2d 410 is almost identical to this
case on its facts.

there the accident occurred
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at 10:15 p.m., the abutter was in control of the
corner property, plaintiff lived two houses away
from the place of the accident, a three-foot high
wire mesh fence existed in front of the abutting
property four inches from the sidewalk, a clump
of ice plant had gro\m through the fence onto

the public sidewalk and had been there for some
time, plaintiff walked from the corner with the

fence on his right, his body was about a foot
from the fence, he was looking directly ahead
but not down on the sidewalk, he did not see anything on the sidewalk in front of him but slipped
on the ice plant.

Plaintiff sued both the city

and the abutter.

On a jury verdict against both

defendants, the city appealed but the abutter did
not.

The court, in affirming, said at page 416:
"It is '~ell settled that, in the

absence of notice or knol~ledge to the
contrary, a pedestrian making normal use
of the public side\-1alk has a right to
assume that it is in reasonable safe condition, and l>~hile he must use ordinary
care for his personal safety and make
reasonable use of his faculties to avoid
injury to himself, he ie not required to
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keep his eyes fixed on the ground or to be
on constant lookout for danger. Even if a
defect is one which might be visible to a
person who is looking for such a condition,
it does not follow that a pedestrian is
guilty of negligence as a matter of law in
failing to see and avoid it. Whether plaintiff made reasonable use of her faculties
and lo~hether she should have observed the
condition which caused her injury were
questions of fact. The evidence was clearly
sufficient to support the implied finding of
the jury that plaintiff was not contributorily
negligent."

Here, there is nothing to show plaintiff was not
walking carefully, she saw nothing to alarm her and
did not see ~-1hat caused her to fall.
case

Thus, this

also presents a jury question as to con-

tributary negligence.
In Jackson v. Southwestern Public Service

Company, (N. M., 1960) 349 P. 2d 1029, plaintiff,
on crutches, in attempting to step from the curb
to cross the street in the middle of the block,

saw a hole next to the curb four to six feet long,
tuo to three feet wide and six to eight inches
deep with the ground around the hole damp from
rain.

Plaintiff believed he could cross the street
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with safety and put his good foot on the curb
next to the hole, placed his crutches on either
side of the hole, and stepped.

His crutch slipped

off the pavement into the hole and he fell,
injuring his leg.

The court said at pages 1033-34:

"This court has held that mere knowledge
that a walk is defective is not enough to constitute contributory negligence. Even if the
l-lal!c is defective, if a reasonably prudent
person believes he can cross it lJith safety,
the knowledge of such defect does not constitute contributory negligence as a matter
of lal-1 • • • The only thing to convict
plaintiff of contributory negligence is the
existence of the hole and t~e £act that he
fell. This does not make ~vt a case where
reasonable minds would not differ."
Likewise in McLaughlin v. City of Los Angeles,
(Cal., 1943) 140 P. 2d 416, plaintiff, walking
along an unimproved dirt road, slipped on the edge
of a hole in the road.

The road was rutted and

full of holes, many of which l·7ere a foot or more

deep.

Plaintiff had lived for several years three

blocks from the ac·cident, had often passed the
place of the accident and was quite familiar l-7ith
the conditions there.

The accident occurre~ at
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about 8:30p.m. with no street lights on a dark
clear night.

As plaintiff proceeded along a

fence line on high ground on the side of the
road which was ordinarily clear, he found a car
parked against the fence so he could not pass.

Looking to the left of the car, he sal'1 what
appeared to be a path wide enough for him to pass

between the car and a hole on its left, but as
he started to go around, his foot slipped on the
edge of the hole and he fell sustaining injury.

Defendant contended that the danger confronting
plaintiff was obvious, that he knel·1 the dangerous
condition of the street, and that he l-7as therefore

guilty of negligence in using it at all.

The court

said at page 418:
"If to a man of ordinary prudence it
\vould appear that in spite of the danger

he can by taking available precautions
safely use the passage way, he is not
negligent in using it with those precautions • • • The event, it is true,
proved plaintiff's course around the
automobile to be unsafe, but negligence
is not to be judged exclusively by hindsight. The question of l-1hether plaintiff
exercised due care in attempting to pass
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around the automobile instead of retracing
his steps, was, under the circumstances,

one of fact for the jury."
That is exactly the case here.
her path

\-ISS

clear.

Plaintiff thought

She sau nothing to alarm her

(Deposition p. 17).
Thus tle submit the rule applicable to this

case is that plaintiff's

lcno~o~ledge

of the existence

of the weeds only increased her standard of care
and required her to proceed with caution commensurate with her kno"1ledge and her ability to cope
llith the

to~eeds,

that she must have used only such

care as a reasonably prudent person '-1ould use 1:-1ith

knowledge of the weeds, and that whether or not
she used such care is a question for the jury.

This case is to be distinguished from this
Court's holdings in Eisner v, Salt Lake City,
(1951) 120 Utah 675, 238 P. 2d 416 and in Cole v.
Kloepfer, (1953) 123 Utah 452, 260 P. 2d 518,
where in both cases pedestrians with prior

knowledge of the specific sidewalk defects which
injured them and unobstructed daylight vie,'ls were
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distracted in one instance by a rush of opposing
children and in the other by a speeding automobile.
Both, while distracted and because of the distraction,
stepped in a sidel1alk hole and the court held in both

instances that because the distractions l'7ere not
unexpected and substantial, the consequent forgetfulness constituted contributory negligence as a matter

or lal1.

This case is different from those

f:l-10

cases

in that here (1) there was not a daylight view of

the weeds

(Deposition p. 9), (3) there was not an

unobstructed view of the noose (Deposition

p. 18),

(3) plaintiff had no knowledge of the noose
~eposition p. 18), and (4) there was no evidence

of forgetfulness (Deposition pp. 18, 20).

Indeed

the inference of plaintiff's evidence is one of
all due care.

The Eisner and Cole cases ride off on the
ground of an unsubstantial distraction, whereas
in this case there is no evidence of distraction
but is in fact evidence of careful, attentive,
reasonable
lookout with inability to actually see
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the noose, the exact cause of the accident.

The

Eisner and Cole cases are decided on the ground of
insufficient excuse for not watching where one is

going, whereas here there is no such evidence.
This case is more

lil~e

Hunt v. Tooele City,

(1959) S Utah 2d 323, 334 P. 2d 558, t-1here the
city appealed from a verdict in favor of a
pedestrian who said she did not see the sidewalk
hole in l-Jhich she fell.

The city said she '"as

contributorily negligent in not seeing it, since
it was so obvious, but the court, at page 556,

said:
"In the absence of prior knowledge of
the defect (the pedestrian) had a right to
assume and act on the assumption that the
street l-Jas in reasonably safe condition
for travel."
Here plaintiff had no prior knowledge of the noose
which tripped her, and while she could see the weeds
by the surrounding light, she could also see a path

through the weeds on the sidewalk l-Jhich was
apparently clear and it cannot be said as a matter
of la~o~ Sponsored
thatby theit
uas negligence for her to proceed
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through that apparently clear path.
v. City of Los

An~eles,

860, in holding that

So in OWen

(Cal., 1947) 187 P. 2d

'~hile

plaintiff had

kno~-1ledge

of the general bad condition of the sidel-1alk, she
had no

kno,~ledge

of the specific hole in which she

stepped and therefore the questions of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk were for the jury.
Note also Clalison v. lJalgreen Drug, (1945) 108 Utah

577, 162 P. 2d 759, holding that a pedestrian has
no duty to keep his eyes constantly on the sidewalk.

Wold v. Ogden City,

~953)

P. 2d 453, is distinguishable.

123 Utah 270, 258
There plaintiff

observed in the afternoon a temporary trench dug
by the city in

front of his house and attempted to

step across it at 2:30 a.m. on an extremely dark
night l-lith no lights in the vicinity and l-Ias
injured when a side of the trench gave '"ay under

his foot.

This Court held plaintiff l-las contributorily

negligent and had assumed a known risk as a matter
of la,~, saying at page 456:
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"To deliberately attempt to cross under
such circumstances seems to be that type of
lac!~ of due care not attributable to the
ordinary prudent person exercising care for
his own safety • • • It would seem that a
reasonable, prudent person would not expose
himself to a knolm danger lo~hen there is an
easy, knoon and convenient route around it."
Here, plaintiff did not know of the noose
which tripped her.

True, in Hold, the court said

it was
11

(N)o answer to say that plaintiff may not have known the bank of the
trench would give way, since no adult person
of ordinary intelligence, knowing of the
trench '-3ould take such chances on what
counsel characterized as being an 'extremely
dark area, no lights and in the middle of
the night and in the shade of trees, 1 l-lhere
there was an easy and safe access to his
home in a matter of minutes."
•

•

•

HolJever, in lJgld, the caving of the trench or
slipping into it was a strong likelihood, but it

cannot be said that as a matter of law the tripping
in the noose or loop would be such a strong likelihood that no adult person, kno~1ing of the l-7eeds,
l.zould walk past them, particularly when it is con-

sidered that this area was not so dark as to be

Pitch dark (Deposition p. 9), that there existed
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3n

apparently safe and convenient route past the

weeds on the clear sidewalk, and that plaintiff

had walked safely past the weeds before
(Deposition p.

20).

We submit that it is a question for the jury
as to whether plaintiff, standing on the corner

and knowing of the

l~eeds,

exercised that degree of

due care for her own safety which the ordinary
prudent person would use.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING PLAINTIFF
ASSUNED THE RISK AS A MATTER OF LAl'J, AND THE

RECORD lvAS INSUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO SO
RULE.

In Wold v. Ogden City, ~~2_ra~ this Court

applied the doctrine of assumption of risk saying
at page 456, ''(the doctrine) has been extended to
some situations where one knol-lS of a condition and
concludes to accept its attendant hazards and acts
accordingly without force of necessity."

This

case is distinguishable from Wold, for there the
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knouledge of the trench constituted, by plaintiff's m~n admission, "a know danger," but in

this case it cannot be said that the weeds themselves constituted a known danger to one walking

through the apparently clear path of sidewalk
past the weeds.

In Wold, the court approved

this language of Prosser ,E!l_ To~~~' Chapter 9,

Assumption of Risk:
"In the usual case, (plaintiff's)
knowledge and appreciation of the danger
l-Jill be a question for the jury; but
where it is clear that any person of
normal intelligence in his position must
have understood the danger, the issue
must be decided by the court."
Here, plaintiff's lack of kncn-1ledge of the
noose prevented her from appreciating the danger
and certainly the amount of danger, and there-

fore it is a jury question whether the knowledge
of the lo7eeds themselves would cause a reasonably

prudent person to appreciate the danger so as to
take another route.
In Clay v.

Dunfor~J

(1952) 121 Utah 171, 239

P. 2d 1075, this Court said at 1076:
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"The essential elements of assumed
risk are knowledge, actual or implied, by
the plaintiff of a specific defect or
dangerous condition caused by the negligence
of the defendant in the violation of some
duty owed to the plaintiff, together with
plaintiff's appreciation of the danger to
be encountered and his voluntary exposure
of himself to it • • • Knowledge of the
risk is the watchword of • • • assumption
of risk • • • Furthermore, plaintiff's
failure to exercise ordinary care to discover the danger is not properly a matter
of assumption of risk, but of the defense
of contributory negligence."

And Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion
pointed out, "Carelessness is not the same thing
as

intelligent choice."

Thus it is clear that

for assumption of risk to apply, plaintiff must
have knowledge of the specific defect and here,
she had no knowledge of the noose, and it cannot

be said she was contributorily negligent in not
seeing it.
Assumption of risk also involves voluntary
exposure to risk, or as more precisely put in
Jacques v. Farrimond, (1963) 14 Utah 2d 166, 380
P. 2d 133, did plaintiff have a reasonable
opportunity to make an alternative choice.

Here
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pla1ntiff 1 s alternative was to go around the weeds.
That meant either walking in the street to her
house, an obviously greater danger, or proceeding
north across Zenith Avenue to the north side of
the street and east up Zenith to 14th East, a
distance of one block, across Zenith and back
west to her home, a distance of an additional
three quarters of a block.

As put in Prosser,

supra, page 312:
"The risk is not assumed where the
conduct of the defendant has left the
plaintiff no reasonable alternative • • •
One who uses a defective highway does not
assume the risk where there is no reasonable
alternative route. In general the plaintiff
is not required to surrender a valuable legal
right, such as the use of his own property as
he sees fit, because the defendant's conduct
has threatened harm if the right is exercised.
By placing him in the dilemma, the defendant
has deprived him of his freedom of choice,
and so cannot be heard to say that he has
voluntarily assumed the risk."
Certainly the right to walk on the public
sidewalk without running into unreasonable
obstruction is a similar valuable legal right.
t~old

In

v. Ogden City, _!.u_p_!:"a, there was justification
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for the trench in that the city can reasonably
temporarily inconvenience residents while digging
necessary trenches.

However, in this case there

was simply no justification whatsoever for the
weeds overgrowing the sidewalk.

How can defen-

dants permit the weeds to overgrow the sidewalk,

which have no utility whatsoever, and then claim
the plaintiff voluntarily assumed that risk when
she reasonably exercised her right to walk on

the public sidewalk through a path which. appeared
to be safe at the time.
Certainly in point is Owen v. City of Los
~geles,

supra.

The California Court, when defen-

dant appealed on grounds of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk, said at 187 P. 2d 864:
"(Plaintiff) testified that before she
stepped down she looked, that it was light
enough to see the surface of the~~ but
that she did not notice the hole. The pavement in the gutter had been washed away along
the curb, not only in the particular location,
but for a considerable distance, including an
area in front of plaintiff's home, which
adjoined the place of her fall. While plaintiff's knowledge of the general condition of
the gutter is admitted, it does not appear
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that the erosion had created a generally
dangerous condition, nor does it appear
that plaintiff had knowledge that a hole
existed at the point where she stepped
from the curb. She testified that she did
not know it. Of course, her knowledge of
the general condition made it her duty to
proceed into the street with more care than
~auld have been demanded if she had been
without such knowledge. It was her duty
to look and to step down not casually, but
carefully, for she had no right under the
circumstances to believe that the surface
of the gutter was even and smooth • • •
~ether one who looked, did so carefully,
is a question of fact • • • While there
was a general condition of erosion, there
was no evidence that there was a generally
dangerous condition, or that the erosion
had left other holes such as the one in
question. It was this hole, and not the
condition of the gutter generally, that
caused plaintiff's accident • • • Knowledge
that danger exists is not knowledge of the
amount of danger necessary to charge a
person with negligence in ~ssuming the
risk caused by such danger. The doing of
an act with appreciation of the amount of
danger in addition to mere appreciation
of the danger is necessary in order to say
that as a matter of law that a person is
negligent. Plaintiff was not chargeable
with knowledge of the danger of the
particular condition as a matter of law,
merely because she had knowledge of the
general condition of the surroundings.
It is a question of fact whether her
knowledge was such as to charge her with
assumption of the risk."
We submit that the Owen case presents exactly
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the same factual situation as this case with regard
to assumption of risk and contributory negligence
and the same result must follow.

The basis of the

trial court's ruling on assumption of risk in the
Summary Judgment, being, "plaintiff l-.7as aware of
the hazard that existed'' (R. 28), is destroyed by

the Owen case, for here plaintiff also testified
she did not and could not see the noose or loop
of weeds (Deposition pp. 18, 20).
In Jackson v. Southwestern Pacific Service
Co.,

~upra,

where plaintiff attempted to go over

a known hole on his crutches, defendants raised

the defense of assumption of risk.

The court

decided that assumption of risk was a jury question
upon the same grounds that it decided that con-

tributory negligence was a matter for the jury,
holding that mere knowledge that a walk is
defective is not enough to constitute contributory

negligence or assumption of risk as a matter of
law since even if the walk is defective, if a

reasonably prudent person believes he can cross
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it with safety, the knowledge of such defect does
not constitute contributory negligence or assumption of risk as a matter of law.

Note also that

in McLaughlin v. City of Los Angeles, supra, and
in Rodriguez v. City of Los Angeles, supra, plaintiff in each case lived close to the defect in the
sidewalk and must have had knowledge thereof, but
the court in each instance refused to hold defendant not liable as a matter of law.
Finally, there was insufficient evidence in
the record for the court to make any determination
whatsoever as to \oJhat reasonable alternative was
available to plaintiff.

Plaintiff on trial would

offer evidence of the many cars moving in and out
of the Beefeaters' parking lot abutting the sidewalk on the north side of Zenith Avenue to present
a jury question as to whether reasonable minds would
think it safer to cross Zenith Avenue at the Highland Drive intersection and walk past the Beefeaters'
parking lot driveway at night with cars moving in
and out over the sidewalk or to walk through the
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apparently clear path on the sidewalk with the
overgrowing \.Jeeds.

The trial court did not have

such evidence before it when it ruled upon the
t*lotion and nothing recorded precludes plaintiff
from offering such evidence.

Therefore it cannot

be said that the record irrefutably shows plain-

tiff assumed the risk as a matter of law.
We submit that the question of assumption of
risk was a matter for the jury in this case not
only because it cannot be said as a matter of law
that a reasonable person would not have acted as
plaintiff did herein, but also because there is
no factual basis in the record for the Court to
determine whether plaintiff had a reasonable
alternative choice of routes.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that defendant
Bettilyon's, Inc., abutter to the public sidewalk,
had a duty to remove weeds overgrowing from its
property onto the public sidewalk, not only because
it was negligence
to not remove them, but because
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they constituted a nuisance, or if an abutter has
no duty to remove natural overgrowth, there is
nothing in this record to determine, as a matter
of law, whether or not these weeds were a natural

.

or artificial condition and plaintiff's evidence
will

sho''~

the weeds 'tJere an artificial condition

caused by Bettilyon's.

Therefore, Summary Judg-

ment should not have been entered dismissing
Bettilyon's on that question.

Further, it is

submitted that it is a question for the jury

whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent
since the mere fact of plaintiff's walking and
falling at night on a sidewalk 'to~hich she knew

generally to be partially overgrown with weeds
does not constitute contributory negligence as a
matter of la'toJ.

Finally it is submitted that the

record shows that plaintiff did not have such

knowledge of the hazard and degree of danger
that it can be said she assumed the risk as a

matter of law, nor is there sufficient evidence
in the record to determine the reasonableness of
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alternatives open to plaintiff to rule upon the
issue of assumption of risk.

Therefore, the

Summary Judgment entered herein in favor of both

defendants should be reversed and the case
remanded for trial upon its merits.

Respectfully submitted,
SI<EEN, HORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN and
JOSEPH J. PALMER

Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
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